Monday, April 2, 2018

Core Post 4 – Week 12 – The Extent of Convergence

All the readings for this week delved directly with relation of television and the advent of convergence in the present age. However, for me, Jenkins’ short paper provided a lot of insight into an already tumultuous media landscape. To summarize his argument, he goes into detail about how media convergence theory goes beyond the technical to the cultural i.e. cultural ideologies within society have a strong influence on the manner in which media, audience, and technology converge, thus creating a very altered sphere of television theory. According to him, convergence doesn’t just happen because of advancements but that is a two-fold and two-way phenomenon, where it is influenced by the innovations of today, audience opinions but also influences their outcomes in return. This most dominant when he talks about how ‘convergence is also a risk for creative industries, because it requires media companies to rethink old assumptions about what it means to consume media – assumptions that shape both programing and marketing decisions’ (pp. 37). 

This is something I have observed in the rapid evolution of Indian television content and production over the past 15 years. Till about the 90s, television in India was still in its infancy, with very few channels and almost all of them routed through the government. But as the percentage of the middle class burgeoned, the demand for more content also increased, which in turn led to the launch of satellite televisionand countless channels and programs that exist today. In addition, in the past 5-6 years, many of the main television channels that air fictional content such as Star TV, Colors, Sony Entertainment Television etc. have also had to turn digital in lieu of large number of streaming applications entering the market. Further, echoing what Jenkins discusses throughout his article, Sony Entertainment Television (India) is launching a new reality show that is tying their Sony LIV app along with the show, where the theme is to test an audience’s power of observation about India and its people by getting them to audition, answer questions, and interact with the show’s anchor/producers only through the app. According to news, ‘to up the engagement quotient, the app will also bring alive the charismatic show host, Salman Khan (a popular Bollywood star), via special fun video messages and give users an opportunity to record and share a ‘velfie’ (Video Selfie) with him.’

Since the show is to be released later this year, we will have to wait to see the success of this experiment and what it means for the television landscape of India. But it is clear that they are working on some of the changes Jenkins listed out – revising audience measurement, redesigning the digital economy, rethinking media aesthetics, renegotiating relationships between producers and consumers, and re-engaging citizens. However, there are still other factors that seem unclear on how they will feature in this experiement, even in other markets, namely regulation and ownership, as both aspects have been highly debated topics that have gone constant scrutinty and changes to fit the dynamic social environments.

Core Post #4--Sarah Johnson


In the Jenkins piece for this week, I found an enormous amount of material that I wanted to talk about for my presentation. I was surprised how relevant the piece remains after fourteen years. I did not feel the same with the Caldwell piece. It felt as though none of it felt like there was anything particularly spectacular was being said. For the purposes of this core post I’m going to focus on the second point that Jenkins makes on “regulating media content.”
I definitely agree that there has been a push away from least objectionable programming (LOP) and more towards narrowcasting, but on an even more exaggerated scale than I think that Jenkins is referring to in 2004. This is making it harder and harder for parents to control what their children are being exposed to on a day-to-day basis despite having the ability to enable parental controls on most streaming services and game consoles. The problem is parents are getting lazy and relying on companies to restrict what their children have access to at a time when they should be more vigilant than ever. The prime example for this is the debacle surrounding YouTube Kids, an app that is a watered-down version of YouTube that is a lot more restrictive as to what content is let through. Up until the most recent wave of the Adpocolypse, kids’ channels were the only ones that had yet to be hit by losing ad-sense. Not only were these channels not being targeted by the Adpocolypse, these channels get some of the best CPM rates  due to the assumption that they are advertiser friendly. YouTube was relying heavily on the algorithm to determine what would be featured on the YouTube Kids app and in searches made for things such as ‘Frozen’ and ‘Spiderman.’ Because of this reliance on the infamous algorithm, parents felt that they did not need to worry about what their kids were watching on YouTube. That all changed once advertisers were made aware of certain types of channels that would put characters targeted towards kids in situations that might not be considered kid-friendly. This most recent pull out of advertisers seems to be sparked by a Medium article (https://medium.com/@jamesbridle/something-is-wrong-on-the-internet-c39c471271d2). This has caused YouTube as a company to rethink how to define what constitutes as appropriate material for children in terms of their algorithm. This seems to be a recurring theme for YouTube, and they have been handling it poorly in the eye of many of the creators on the site. This in part is due to YouTube showing their hand on who they are more invested in protecting, the advertisers.

Core post #4


To get a little self-indulgent for a moment, it seems that this is the semester where, whether I am expecting or meaning to or not, I cannot help but becoming preoccupied with those elements of various scholarly texts that engage with that big, hulking thing of a concept that is “postmodernism.” Caldwell’s delineation of “convergence TV’s” six “textual augmentations” offered a number of engaging moments along these lines, though I suppose I should have been expecting this what with words like “reflexivity” showing up in the title of his most recent single-authored book. For example, in Caldwell’s discussion of branding/marketing forms, he offers the example of ABC’s mid-1990s “yellow campaign,” with its “Pavlovian” signature branded hue attached to ironic statements that played on, for instance, the “exaggerated claims of mental decline (that TV is mind numbing and lowers literacy)… attributed to television by concerned consumer advocacy groups and liberal watchdogs” (54). For Caldwell, this advertising scheme enabled ABC, a relatively conservative legacy network, to compete with the “true postmodern irony” cultivated by its hip cable competitors (MTV, VH1, Fox) by “making irony and pastiche a part of… institutional and promotional self-reference” (54).

While it is often easy to default to noting the ways that postmodernist aesthetics/logics flare up in such superstructural, textual things as TV programs and advertisements, Caldwell’s emphasis on “cultures of production” helps us understand the ways in which these texts (or televisual “flow” more broadly) are shaped by groups made up of individuals, these groups’ professional rituals and embedded institutional logics, competing interests among producers, etc. This intervention acknowledges the ways in which political economic and technological change-based explanatory frameworks can help us understand the workings and “evolutions” of institutional logics and textual production. But, like Jenkins, Caldwell wants to complicate assumptions that change (or convergence) is “determined” by any primary causal factor (or field of factors) or that influence/power works in any one direction.

Jenkins’ essay likewise works through issues surrounding conflicting and competing forces that will have a hand in shaping the unfolding process of media convergence. His self-described “sketchy” approach to this topic opens up questions, not prognostications or extended demystifications. Conversely, Caldwell’s much longer piece winds up in demystifiying move that might make one cringe about all the ways in which one cannot help but be tickled by TV’s success at making its whole flow seem like a universe of deftly reflexive iterations of brand identity and cleverly interpenetrating diegeses. That is, like many of our readings from previous weeks, Caldwell points us to the extent to which the apparent triumph of multiculturalism and racial minority “representation” in the mainstream cultural sphere (in this case in television specifically) really just masks other logics—imbricated, as ever, with a post-Fordist economy. Foregrounding the continued moves toward corporate conglomeration and proliferating channels since the 1980s, Caldwell notes that while television programming may now be more “diverse” and demographically “representative” when taken in total, television has nonetheless “resegregated itself by the very tiering and conglomeration that the new multichannel landscape has legitimized. Yes, images of color [exist], but not on the still-very-white worlds of NBC, CBS, and ABC programming” (68). TV executives, producers, and brands themselves can now tout their achievements in “diversity,” but this ultimately serves to deflect criticism, shore up conglomeration as the new, best-of-all-possible-worlds reality, and promote the idea that the industry needs no regulation because the free market “naturally” favors diversity. In Caldwell’s words, “the de facto goal of each new conglomerate is to have within the walls of its extended corporate family a programming niche for every taste culture and social identity” (69). So, we might prognosticate that TV’s mastery of such postmodern tropes as intertextuality will just wind up bringing us closer to the hyperbolic logical conclusion of convergence: everything under one giant conglomeration of all corporations ever… but then that level of prognostication would be missing the usefully anti-determinist dimensions of Caldwell’s argument.

Westworld- Non-core post - Chris LeMaire


Watching the pilot again on Tuesday reminded me of how frustrated I get with Westworld. I really want to like it. It has a huge budget, major talent attached, and a lot of compelling ideas. And yet, it’s so bland and uninteresting. To me, all the characters are not only unlikable, but undeveloped. The show has all the markers of genre such as the western, sci-fi, and even melodrama, but no characters to back it up. I guess the whole point of the show is the central mystery—or the multiple mysteries— who is a host?, who the hell is Arnold?, what is the maze?, when is any given scene even taking place (there’s a lot of hidden jumps in time)? In other words, what is going on? I watched the entire first season while it was airing and even stuck with these mysteries, but it became so difficult to care. I was thinking about the Katman reading, and how Lost has such a similar “complex narrative” structure, but still embraces the plot, characters, and melodramatic elements. Westworld, I think, is another example of these new forms of “auteurist TV,” in which we are supposed to just trust that the creator of the show has some sort of mind-blowing reveal that will make all the hours of being in the dark worth it.

I probably will give season two a try (the trailer is just too good), but I’m not very hopeful at this point. If anything, it seems like the scale of the mystery is only getting bigger, which I doubt will bode well for the characters and story.

What's at Stake in Industry Studies? - Core Post 4


I must admit, I’m not a fan of industry studies. I don’t think I’ve encountered anything quite so successful at sucking the joy out of T.V. as studying the corrupt, banal industries that produce it. Of course, I recognize that there is a necessity to studying the industry. I think Caldwell’s point that “studying television’s ‘production of culture’ is simply no longer entirely convincing if one does not also talk about television’s ‘culture of production’” (45) is a good one. It is important to be aware of the industrial changes that have occurred across T.V.’s history of production, particularly as media becomes consolidated in fewer and fewer wealthy hands, a history which Holt kindly lays out for us at the end of her article. And Jenkins is an excellent rejoinder to Holt and Caldwell, reminding us that “convergence is both a top-down corporate-driven process and a bottom-up consumer-driven process” (37), or that corporations do not hold all the power, even if they hold most of it, which is perhaps where his optimism that public intellectuals might speak back to and correct the powers wielded by “policy makers and industry alike” stems from.
                But does industry studies really need to be this banal, or is it just me? I find it difficult to keep up with Caldwell’s argument not just because his writing is encyclopedic and the subject matter is not all that thrilling, but because I don’t quite understand how raw knowledge of the industry empowers me and I don’t see much possibility of a dialogue in industry studies – there doesn’t seem to be anything to argue about. Caldwell’s conclusion seems to be simply that Television adapted well to the digital age, finding that it could still be profitable after a brief scare. I find Jenkins’ form of industry studies more promising than Caldwell and Holt’s, as, though he might be overly optimistic about the role of public intellectuals, at least he offers some paths, though loosely set out, for changing the industry and the media landscape, for how we might form a new media politics, for the types of regulations we want and don’t want. Of course, we need to understand the industry in order to change it, so Caldwell is once again right about the “culture of production” – but, in order to figure out what we want the industry to become, we still need to understand the “production of culture,” and in order to do that we still need textual analysis and speculative, theoretical thinking; those things that tend to get erased in moves towards more material “truths.”
I suppose, in other words, I want to know why industry studies seems so safe. What keeps Holt and Caldwell from making claims like Jenkins does about what the industry should be doing and how intellectuals should be talking back to the industry (perhaps they do in other places)? Also, how might we connect today’s industry studies all the way back to McLuhan, who seemed to practice a type of industry studies (though definitely very different from Holt and Caldwell) fused with speculative, flamboyant ideas?

Sunday, April 1, 2018

Convergence (Cult)ure? - Core Post 5

This week's readings look at the transition from older, passive audience studies approach to the participatory cultures approach in television/media studies. While Jennifer Holt and John Caldwell are interested in exploring how shifting regulatory mechanisms and industrial practices have altered television's form, Henry Jenkins explores how media convergence, the process by which media comes to saturate the environment and its many forms blend together in new technological and cultural formations, is a sociocultural phenomenon that is reshaping social structures and cultural attitudes. For Jenkins, convergence "represents a reconfiguration of media power and a reshaping of media aesthetics and economics" (35). Read together, Caldwell and Holt provide the social and economic foundations of convergence while Jenkins' considers convergence from a cultural perspective.

I particularly liked Caldwell's shift from looking at TV's "culture of production" in order to understand TV's "production of culture" (48), allowing us to consider how televisual forms emerge from performance (or what I would call social practice). Far from being a monolithic industry determined solely by political economy, television is "managed by divergent socio-professional rituals, now codified in the industrial culture. Televisual form is very much lived" (61).  Though, as Holt reminds us, the industrial economy is still important for understanding a medium like television as sweeping changes in regulation in a post-Fordist economy lead to the formation of conglomerates focused on synergy.

I had trouble with Jenkins' article that I am still attempting to work through. Part of the trouble is that I think many of Jenkins' observations are correct and have come to pass in the 10+ years since the article is written. One way I tried to read the article was to try to answer the questions Jenkins poses around his 9 sites where the changing relationship between producers and consumers is most probable. It's clear that Jenkins is working through what he considers to be a formation in process. I don't think he is trying to make an authoritative claim on what will happen and he observes that the rate and distribution of convergence will be uneven and that cultural studies scholars should take an active and participatory role in influencing the shape of these formations.

But, I still have trouble squaring Jenkins' tone. Throughout the article, I wondered if Jenkins takes the categories of consumers and producers for granted, as if they were natural categories and not the product of the distinction of economics as a separate sphere of human activity. Further, his borrowing of Pierre Levy's concept of "collective intelligence" suggests a utopian vision of convergence pulled from the early imaginings of cyberspace that emphasize communities of voluntary associations free from coercion or relations of power. When Jenkins asks us to consider a world where a media "message gains visibility only if it is deemed relevant to a loose network of diverse publics" (35), he does not ask how or why something is deemed relevant, questions that are deeply important to sociocultural investigations. (Was anyone else thrown off by his reading of The Truman Show!?)

While I think criticizing Jenkins for being utopian is a more of a critique of attitude than content, I think it is fair to ask who benefits from such utopian framings. Read at its most generous, this frame allows us to leave space to consider how new forms of political participation, for example, have opened up due to convergence and how the field is open for us to shift discourse and practices in new and exciting ways. At its most critical, however, this utopian frame could be read as a reification of consumer politics, redefining "struggle" as "participation." It suggests the only power available to us is through consumption and that any previous political struggles and frames (like the Marxist critiques cultural studies dearly loves) are no longer relevant.

Non-core post – Another failed attempt at regulation…


While reading Holt’s piece on the story of media conglomeration/vertical integration, I kept coming back to Argentina’s recent history. Holt explains how studio companies started partnering up with distribution companies and broadcasters so as to control content and its distribution, a process enabled and even (although unintended at some point) promoted by the changing regulatory landscape. Well, Argentina’s past government crafted a law in 2009 precisely to separate content and distribution. The video I’m leaving here explains a bit of this. This law ended up being a failed attempt to democratize the media landscape, which was still regulated by a law enacted during the last military government, because it led to never-ending legal battles that held the audience hostage to arguments from both sides – it really was a political struggle dressed up as a fight for democracy. But I think it’s interesting to think of media convergence in other contexts where not only socio-political dynamics are different but also infrastructure access, like Jenkins suggests.


https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2015/03/argentina-reforming-media-landscape-150324101323459.html